More companies are publishing environmental and social reports, but concerns remain about the extent to which these reports reflect a genuine intention of businesses to make themselves accountable for their social and environmental performance or whether they are merely a way of maintaining corporate reputation in the face of external criticism. Dialogue with stakeholders lies at the heart of Corporate Social Responsibility practice. While questionnaire surveys are a main method for consulting large stakeholder groups, little has been written about how (...) the data used in CSR reports are generated. This paper argues that the survey method can be adapted in ways to promote dialogue and hence stakeholder inclusion, without loss of technical rigour. It presents a case study of how one company conducted a large‐scale multinational employee survey and identifies key design features of the survey process that were used to enhance the quality of dialogue between the company and its employees. The purpose of stakeholder consultation and dialogue is to find mutually agreed solutions to identified issues of concern. It can only claim to be an ethical business practice if it strives to achieve this overarching purpose. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to present the major factors that lead to ethical dissolution in an organization. Specifically, drawing from a wide spectrum of sources, this study explores the impact of organizational, individual, and contextual factors that converge to contribute to ethical dissolution. Acknowledging that ethical decisions are, in the final analysis, made by individuals, this study presents a model of ethical dissolution that gives insight into how a variety of elements coalesce to draw individuals into decisions that (...) result in the ethical undoing of an otherwise healthy organization. ENRON, TYCO and WorldCom did not happen in a vacuum. Nor can such debacles be explained as simply one or two individuals who were morally corrupt. The ethical breakdowns that occurred in these companies happened over a period of time, involved numerous individuals both inside and outside of the organization, and brought about the implosion of viable companies. Seeking to extend the work of previous researchers, this study attempts to tie together a disparate set of factors into a cohesive explanation of ethical breakdowns in organizations. (shrink)

The reputations of scientists among their contemporaries depend not only on accomplishment, but also on interactions affected by influence and personality. The historical lore of most fields of scientific endeavor preserve these reputations, often through the identification of founders, innovators, and prolific workers whose contributions are considered fundamental to progress in the field. Historians frequently rely on the historical lore of scientists to guide their studies of the development of ideas, exhibiting justifiable caution in reassessing reputations in the light of (...) current knowledge. However, the transmission of historical lore can obscure the relative importance of accomplishment, influence and personality in shaping contemporary reputations, leaving the historian to either accept reputations at face value or attempt to reconstruct the context in which they were created. The science of taxonomy, because of its rules of priority, leaves a relatively accurate record of historical accomplishment through the persistence of taxa in catalogues and faunal guides. These records allow the modern historian an unbiased means to assess the relative accomplishments of historical figures and therefore a means to critically reassess reputations independent of personality and influence. In the historical lore of North American ichthyology, Louis Agassiz at Harvard and Spencer Baird at the Smithsonian emerge as central figures in the early development of the field during the mid-1800s, contributing not only through the quality and quantity of their science, but also through their roles as institutional leaders and mentors to workers who followed. Charles Girard, originally a student of Agassiz's and later a coworker with Baird, receives little notice in the history of ichthyology, and his reputation is that of a minor player in the initial description of the North American fish fauna, and one whose work appears to have been flawed or even careless when compared to his contemporaries. However, a review of both contemporary and modern taxonomic works reveals that Girard's productivity far exceeded that of either Agassiz or Baird. Furthermore, an examination of the tendency of Girard and his contemporaries to introduce synonymous names into the literature, which might reflect careless or uncritical work, suggests that Girard was among the more accomplished workers of his era, including Agassiz and Baird. Girard's low ranking in the folklore of North American ichthyology, therefore, can not be attributed to discernible shortcomings in his scientific work, but rather to a public and private campaign of criticism waged by Agassiz after Girard's departure from Harvard. While Agassiz's dispute with Girard stemmed from their personal interactions, he expressed them as criticisms of Girard's work, and thus helped shape Girard's scientific reputation as it has been transmitted through the lore of ichthyology. This case study reveals how scientific reputation may not always rest on accomplishment, but can be influenced by personal interactions obscured by time but nonetheless important to history. (shrink)

This Special Issue reflects a very special occasion. On 13 January 2012, the Tilburg Law School marked the retirement of Associate Professor Dr. Hanneke van Schooten and the recent publication of her latest book, Jurisprudence and Communication (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 2011) with a special colloquium, at which Dr. Van Schooten summarised the findings of her book, and four colleagues offered responses to it, three (by Jackson, van Roermund and Witteveen, here developed further). -/- .

Our beloved colleague, Charles Arthur Willard, has died at the age of 76. He will be remembered within the argumentation community not only as an influential theorist but also as one of the chief architects of an international and interdisciplinary field devoted to the study of argumentation.

Later reprinted by Deborah Charles Publications (and not available from Amazon), this book expounds and comments on the application of Greimasian semiotics to a legal text, as found in the article by Greimas and Landowski in Greimas, Sémiotique et Sciences Sociales (1976), compares this with the semiotic presuppositions of Hart, Dworkin, MacCormick and Kelsen, and offers my own analysis of the implications of such semiotic analysis for legal theory, including some more recent radical non-positivist accounts.

This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this (...) evidence allows Reid and Peirce a way out of the dilemma between dogmatism and skepticism regarding the justification of such principles, insofar as they are epistemically, and not solely practically, justified. (shrink)

Stasis is a process of classical rhetoric that identifies the core issue in a trial or a similar debate. Hermagoras of Temnos included the first comprehensive analysis of stasis in his second-century BCE treatise on rhetoric, now lost. Modern scholars tend to echo George Kennedy, who maintains that Hermagoras’ inspiration for the hierarchical structure of stasis is indeterminate. This article, however, employs scholarship in legal semiotics, including the work of Miklós Könczöl and Bernard S. Jackson, to argue that Hermagoras (...) based stasiastic structure on Aristotle’s first-figure syllogism. Ideally, knowledge of that structure can enhance modern applications of stasis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and MusicTerese M. VolkCarolyn Livingston, Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and Music ( Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2003)There are many biographical studies in music education history.1 Indeed, it seems one of the easiest fields in historical research to mine—that is, until the researcher finds him or herself in the midst of what could be a years-long endeavor. Then the (...) choice is to commit to the research or quit. Carolyn Livingston did not quit. Her research began in 1981, continued through twenty years of investigations, interviews, library searches, and analyses, and has culminated in Charles Faulkner Bryan: His Life and Music. This book is not just the usual sequence of events in the life of a musician. Rather, it is more like becoming acquainted with someone you have never met before, yet feel comfortable with immediately. Charles Faulkner Bryan is genuinely likeable, and Livingston brings the person of Bryan to the fore and lets his humanity shine through his life and his music.Charles Faulkner Bryan: His life and Music is divided into two sections (pre- and post-WWII), each with four chapters. Livingston looks at this musician from several perspectives: the composer, the educator, the researcher, and the man. Appalachian folk music is the theme that connects the chapters, as it connected the events in Bryan's life. [End Page 211]Chapter 1 focuses on Bryan's youth, during which he and his family discovered his musical abilities. From performing at school, to building his own "turtle uke,"2 to his studies at the Nashville Conservatory of Music, Livingston describes the family support behind his developing musicality. Chapter 2 shows the reader his humanity even more clearly. Livingston tells of his early career as a music educator at the Tennessee Polytechnic institute; his marriage; and his mentorship of a young Black singer, J. Robert Bradley. That Bryan, a white Southerner, gave voice lessons to Bradley was not only generally unheard of with segregation as it was in the United States during the 1930s, but was dangerous to his career as well. Bryan moved on to teach at Peabody College in Nashville and then worked for the Works Progress Administration (WPA) Music Program on the Tennessee Music Project. Later he became the assistant state coordinator for the Tennessee State Defense Council. During both of these service positions, he called for music education improvements in Tennessee. Commenting on his work during this period, Livingston says, "Bryan was both of his time and ahead of his time... grounded in reality and yet visionary."3In Chapter 3, Livingston gives the reader a review of the "status of folk music scholarship and performance" as it existed in the 1930s.4 She takes pains to introduce the folk music researchers and musicians who influenced Bryan in his work with Appalachian folk music: Lucien L. McDowell and Flora Lassiter McDowell, George Pullen Jackson, Charles Seeger, and John Jacob Niles. These connections and friendships were to influence his awareness of Appalachian folk music and would continue for the rest of his life. By 1945 he had come to be considered an authority on folk music in his own right and his vision of this music came to encompass "the ultimate meaning in representing America itself."5Chapter 4 traces Bryan's development as a composer. It is in this chapter that Livingston begins to incorporate analyses of Bryan's most popular compositions. Her reviews of these compositions are clear and detailed without being overly theoretical. Some of the selections she analyzes include "Charlottown," "The Ballad of the Harp Weaver," and the White Spiritual Symphony. The Symphony in particular shows his respect for the folk songs he incorporated in this composition. Indeed, as Livingston points out several times, he maintained the integrity of these songs in all his compositions and performances. Chapter 4 concludes with Bryan's academic achievements: a Guggenheim Fellowship for music composition and his acceptance at Yale University to study composition under Hindemith.Livingston continues the discussion and analyses of Bryan's compositions in Chapter 5, detailing his time at Yale. His completed choral works from this period include the "Bell... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right ed. by Timothy P. JacksonMary M. Doyle RocheReview of The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right EDITED TIMOTHY P. JACKSON Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011. 416 pp. $28.00With The Best Love of the Child, Eerdmans adds to an (...) already impressive roster of books on children and families. While previous contributions to the field have challenged the appropriateness of rights in addressing the needs of children, Best Love explores the “best interest” standard that is commonly used by courts and international bodies to adjudicate cases involving children. The book’s fundamental claim is that what is “best” for children involves being loved and being taught to love. Although the essays in this volume acknowledge that the primary locus for the love and care of children is the family, they also engage other contexts including religious communities, courts, and legislative bodies.In a section dealing with social-psychological perspectives on this theme, Peter Benson and Eugene Roehlkepartain make the case that doing the best for children requires shifting from a deficit model that focuses on what children lack to a model that emphasizes their developmental assets. Other chapters in this section highlight the ways parents can pursue the best for children by introducing them to spiritual practices rooted in love for God and compassion [End Page 231] toward others, and by providing them with a narrative-rich environment that deepens bonds between adults and children.A section on historical perspectives continues this trajectory by highlighting the vocations of children from the late thirteenth century on to the early modern period. In his concluding essay in this section, Charles Reid links historical and contemporary concerns by focusing on the right to life and its implications for analyses of war and healthcare access.In a section on philosophical and theological perspectives, Cynthia Willett challenges liberal understandings of rights in view of the experiences of children and argues for an approach that recognizes a central paradox of human freedom: that relationships of interdependence do not weaken freedom but rather enhance it. This paves the way for developing a sense of collective responsibility for children based on shared commitments to justice and solidarity that reach beyond the privatized family. Richard Osmer tackles the concept of original sin in order to advance a vision of a missional church in which congregations work with families to encourage authoritative—rather than authoritarian—styles of parenting that model mutual forgiveness. Marcia Bunge’s contribution is the most practical, offering a list of practices for children, families, and congregations for nurturing children’s vocations.In a concluding section on legal perspectives, Michael Broyde notes that, in the context of custody cases in Jewish law, the primary question is not who loves the child the most but rather who can best meet the child’s needs in an atmosphere of respect. Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock argue that law can, in fact, foster the love of children and the potential children have for becoming loving themselves by promoting family structures that are stable and afforded status in the community. In this way families can model the covenantal relationships of unconditional love in which children thrive. The collection concludes with an essay by Don Browning that emphasizes weaving together love’s affective elements with the very practical activities of caring for children and respecting their emerging selves.By inviting thoughtful reflection on how loving and being loved are central to the well-being of children in families and other institutions, Best Love makes an important contribution to the interdisciplinary field of childhood studies. The book is best suited for graduate students, although the essays by Osmer and Bunge are relevant to pastoral settings. [End Page 232]Mary M. Doyle RocheCollege of the Holy CrossCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This addition—hence the title Mantissa—to the rich vein of information about Constantine Samuel Rafinesque is in fact a supplement to Charles Boewe's own revised and enlarged edition of Thomas J. Fitzpatrick's book Rafinesque .The details of the peripatetic life of Rafinesque, one of America's most original yet undisciplined naturalists, are too well known to bear repeating here. Suffice it to say that because of the vicissitudes of his life—his perpetual wandering between and within Europe and frontier America, his impecunious (...) circumstances that forced him to find different ways of making a living—finding and identifying his publications is a bibliographer's nightmare. Even now, more than 160 years after his death and with the benefit of serious studies by Fitzpatrick and Boewe, as well as by Richard E. Call and Elmer D. Merrill, among others, we can only approximate the number of his publications, including both original titles and republications. Probably we will never have a complete list of Rafinesque's publications because he published regularly in newspapers, broadsides, sales catalogues, privately printed journals, and other ephemera that are infrequently archived. Even his own references to “published” works cannot be trusted as, to him, this term included papers that he sent to journals but were never published. On the other hand, Rafinesque complained to one correspondent that he never knew whether some of these manuscripts were ever published or he learned only years later that they had been. The total number has been estimated at about a thousand, but, as Boewe points out, this number is based on Fitzpatrick's faulty numbering system in which each version of a paper or volume of a multivolume work was given a number. Thus Fitzpatrick's system, continued by Boewe, represents serial numbers, not individual titles. Rafinesque's own estimate was 220, a number Boewe now thinks is a reasonable guess.The Mantissa is an important addition to Rafinesquiana. It lists twenty hitherto‐unrecorded publications by Rafinesque, thirty‐three new translations or reprints, and more than two hundred newly listed secondary references. For the first time we have a list of every manuscript letter written by Rafinesque that is known to exist, and Boewe provides a documented discussion of Rafinesque publications still remaining to be discovered. Several titles known to me, however, are missing from Mantissa, but Boewe's book represents a learned guide for the next scholar willing to take up the challenge and carry on the search. The newly listed manuscript letters will doubtless be particularly helpful in providing leads to undiscovered publications and other facets of Rafinesque's still not completely understood life. Among his correspondents were fellow naturalists such as John James Audubon, Joseph Banks, Benjamin Barton, Charles Bonaparte, Alexandre Brongniart, Augustin de Candolle, Georges Cuvier, Amos Eaton, Asa Gray, William Jackson Hooker, Muhlenberg, Ord, Paolo Savi, James Edward Smith, William Swainson, and John Torrey, as well as prominent leaders of the day, including John Adams, De Witt Clinton, Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, George IV, Thomas Jefferson, and Joel Roberts Poinsett. A total of 346 letters are listed.More important, Boewe has given us the benefit of his many years of scholarly searching and thinking about Rafinesque in his discussions entitled “Hints about Unlisted Titles,” “Letters as a Source of Leads,” and “Hints in Publications.” We learn, for example, that Rafinesque signed some of his papers simply as “Constantine” or “Linneus.” The Mantissa makes it abundantly clear why arriving at a complete account of Rafinesque's writings is an elusive goal, but Boewe shows us that the attempt still offers an exciting trail to follow. (shrink)

The mind cannot be an object. An object can be conceived only as that which may possibly become an object to something else. Now what can the mind become an object to? Not to me for I am it and not to something else. Not to something else without again being denuded of consciousness.And how could we descend into the depths of our nervous system to ascertain what is the nature of the psychical correlative of the physiological bottom? If we (...) could, we could only describe that correlative psychical in terms of object-consciousness, which would be a pseudo description of it.John Hughlings-Jackson.If Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952) was the most philosophically aware neurophysiologist of the late 19th to early 20th .. (shrink)

This article presents how the act of falling has been used as a metaphor for invention within avant-garde art and aesthetics. It takes Lars von Trier’s documentary The Five Obstacles (2003) as its point of departure and seeks to historically contextualize the figure of falling by discussing Charles Baudelaire’s essay ‘De l’essence du rire et généralement du comique dans les arts plastiques’/‘On the Essence of Laughter’ (1955 [1855–1857]). The article also discusses the fascination with falling in early cinema, stressing (...) how cinematic representations of the fall highlight the new medias potential for grasping general modern conditions like motion, speed and contingency. To think of art in terms of falling makes it possible to see a link between cinematic popular culture and so called high modernism. The article concludes with a discussion of the relationship between control and contingency within film aesthetics in the digital age. I will also discuss the aesthetics of Oulipo writers like George Perec and Raymond Queneau, and artists like Jackson Pollock and John Cage as exponents of what can be called an aesthetics of contingency. (shrink)

In the autumn of 1851, on the occasion of the American Institute of New York's annual fair, the Boston chemist and geologist Charles Jackson chose as the subject of his address the ‘Encouragement and Cultivation of the Sciences in the United States’. Playing on popular enthusiasm for science and technology, Jackson rehearsed the wondrous progress of the arts and the role of science in that progress. Science was the ‘Hand-maiden of the Arts’, and most assuredly the ‘maid (...) of honor’, he declared, for science was the ‘progressive power’ which inspired new inventions. These were commonplace assumptions of the time, and surely no one in his audience would have disputed them. (shrink)

The idea that the brain is a representational organ has roots in the nineteenth century, when neurologists began drawing conclusions about what the brain represents from clinical and experimental studies. One of the earliest controversies surrounding representation in the brain was the “muscles versus movements” debate, which concerned whether the motor cortex represents complex movements or rather fractional components of movement. Prominent thinkers weighed in on each side: neurologists John Hughlings Jackson and F.M.R. Walshe in favor of complex movements, (...) neurophysiologist Charles Sherrington and neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield in favor of movement components. This essay examines these and other brain scientists’ evolving notions of representation during the first eighty years of the muscles versus movements debate (c. 1873–1954). Although participants agreed about many of the superficial features of representation, their inferences reveal deep-seated disagreements about its inferential role. Divergent epistemological commitments stoked conflicting conceptions of what representational attributions imply and what evidence supports them. (shrink)

Charles Stevenson introduced the term 'persuasive definition’ to describe a suspect form of moral argument 'which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning’. However, as Stevenson acknowledges, such a move can be employed legitimately. If persuasive definition is to be a useful notion, we shall need a criterion for identifying specifically illegitimate usage. I criticize a recent proposed criterion from Keith Burgess-Jackson and offer an alternative.

What is the future of Philosophy of education? Or as many of scholars and thinkers in this final ‘future-focused’ collective piece from the philosophy of education in a new key Series put it, what are the futures—plural and multiple—of the intersections of ‘philosophy’ and ‘education?’ What is ‘Philosophy’; and what is ‘Education’, and what role may ‘enquiry’ play? Is the future of education and philosophy embracing—or at least taking seriously—and thinking with Indigenous ethicoontoepistemologies? And, perhaps most importantly, what is that (...) ‘Future’? These debates have been located in the work of diverse scholars: from the West, from Global South, from indigenous thinkers. In this collective piece, we purposefully juxtapose diverse takes on the future of these intersections. We have given up the urge to organise, place together, separate with subheadings or connect the paragraphs that follow. Instead, we let these philosophers of education and thinkers who use philosophical texts and ideas to sit together in one long read as potentially ‘strange and unusual bedfellows’. This text urges us to understand how these scholars and thinkers perceive our educational philosophical futures, and how the work and thinking they have done on thinking about what the future of that new key in philosophy of education may look like is embedded in a much deeper and richer literature, and personal experience. (shrink)

I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature.

Charles Crittenden here offers an original solution to one of the traditional dilemmas of philosophy—whether there can be any thing not existing, since to say that some thing does not exist seems to presuppose its existence. Drawing on the tools of Wittgensteinian philosophy and speech act theory, Crittenden argues that we can and often do make reference to unreal objects such as fictional characters, though they do not exist in any sense at all.

Empirical studies have suggested that language-capable robots have the persuasive power to shape the shared moral norms based on how they respond to human norm violations. This persuasive power presents cause for concern, but also the opportunity to persuade humans to cultivate their own moral development. We argue that a truly socially integrated and morally competent robot must be willing to communicate its objection to humans’ proposed violations of shared norms by using strategies such as blame-laden rebukes, even if doing (...) so may violate other standing norms, such as politeness. By drawing on Confucian ethics, we argue that a robot’s ability to employ blame-laden moral rebukes to respond to unethical human requests is crucial for cultivating a flourishing “moral ecology” of human–robot interaction. Such positive moral ecology allows human teammates to develop their own moral reflection skills and grow their own virtues. Furthermore, this ability can and should be considered as one criterion for assessing artificial moral agency. Finally, this paper discusses potential implications of the Confucian theories for designing socially integrated and morally competent robots. (shrink)

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Academic freedom is often regarded as an absolute value of higher education institutions. Traditionally, its value is related to such topics as tenure, and the need for academic work to be free from undue political influence and other pressures that can challenge time-consuming research processes. However, when an analysis of student freedom begins with arguments about free research and free speech, undergirded as they generally are by liberal political philosophy, other considerations, related to broader views of freedom, can slip through (...) the cracks. In this essay, I want to take a step back from typical discussions of academic freedom, to take a broader perspective, before considering how freedom relates to student experience. The first part of this essay explores diverse elaborations and defences of freedom: How it is upheld in the liberal philosophy of Kant, the critical pedagogy of Freire, existentialism, and the capabilities approach to development. Exploring the often contrasting insights and implications of these views, I then connect relevant theoretical understandings derived from them to an exploration of the experience of freedom and of students. This essay thus considers how student freedom, and student academic freedom, are more precarious concepts than typically assumed. (shrink)

Human suffering is a complex phenomenon that can manifest physically or psychologically. As the negative valence of affective phenomena, with the positive being pleasure or happiness, human suffering could easily be interpreted as something to avoid. Sartre explored existential aspects of human suffering in Being and Nothingness. Examining each occurrence of the word suffering in that work provides a basis for understanding the roles Sartre assigned to it within the human experience and consequently provides a more nuanced appreciation of this (...) complex phenomenon. An electronic copy of Being and Nothingness was searched for all occurrences of the word suffering (N = 50), tabularized using the Key Word In Context (KWIC) approach at the sentence level, resulting in 40 sentences for thematic analysis. That analysis resulted in 5 themes, showing the complexity of suffering in Sartre’s major philosophical work and suggesting that suffering is quintessentially human, unavoidable, and potentially liberating. (shrink)

Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...) and to identify properties with functions from ⟨world, time⟩ pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating. (shrink)

This article compares treatments of the Stern–Gerlach experiment across different physical theories, building up to a novel analysis of electron spin measurement in the context of classical Dirac field theory. Modeling the electron as a classical rigid body or point particle, we can explain why the entire electron is always found at just one location on the detector but we cannot explain why there are only two locations where the electron is ever found. Using non-relativistic or relativistic quantum mechanics, we (...) can explain both uniqueness and discreteness. Moving to more fundamental physics, both features can be explained within a quantum theory of the Dirac field. In a classical theory of the Dirac field, the rotating charge of the electron can split into two pieces that each hit the detector at a different location. In this classical context, we can explain a feature of electron spin that is often described as distinctively quantum but we cannot explain another feature that could be explained within any of the other theories. (shrink)